The Subtraction Rule and its Effects on Pricing in the Electricity Industry by Elberfeld, Walter
Discussion Paper No. 04-21
The Subtraction Rule and its Effects 
on Pricing in the Electricity Industry
Walter Elberfeld
Discussion Paper No. 04-21
The Subtraction Rule and its Effects 
on Pricing in the Electricity Industry
Walter Elberfeld
Die Discussion Papers dienen einer möglichst schnellen Verbreitung von 
neueren Forschungsarbeiten des ZEW. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung 
der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des ZEW dar.
Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW research promptly available to other 
economists in order to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely 
responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0421.pdf
 
    Non-Technical Summary 
 
On April 19, 2001, the cartel offices published the report from the „working group security of 
supply in service of the cartel offices of the federal republic and the states” about 
 
1. the coverage from the intervention norms according to the antitrust regulations in 
inspecting the level of network access charges for power supply usage, and 
  
2. the relevance of the antitrust regulation of impeding behavioral patterns shown by 
electricity network owners in relation of network access.” 
 
The report contains a basic statement of the cartel offices relating to the appropriateness of the 
level of network access charges as well as to impeding behavioral patterns of integrated 
network owners in the electricity industry. Of particular importance in this report is the so-
called subtraction rule (S-rule), which has been proposed to improve the verification of 
improperly inflated network access charges. Under this rule the cartel office would calculate 
the difference between the network owner’s price charged to the consumers and overall 
marginal costs of a rival, including network access charges, which the competitor has to pay 
to the network owner. If this value is negative, it would be concluded that network access 
charges are improperly inflated.  
 
The present paper analyzes the proposed rule within a simple Hotelling-framework.  Two 
states are compared; one state in which the S-rule is implemented, and one where it is not. 
The S-rule changes the network owner’s incentives. Pricing below the rival’s marginal costs 
would violate the S-rule, triggering a sanction. By increasing his price the network owner can 
reduce or avoid the sanction. If the network owner increases his price, the rival will follow 
suit, since reaction functions are upward sloping. Indeed, if the network owner’s marginal 
costs are moderately or much lower than those of his rival, this is what will happen so that the 
S-rule would lead both firms to charge higher prices, making all consumers worse off. 
However, if the network owner is only slightly more or less efficient, then the introduction of 
the S-rule does not affect firms’ behavior, and prices will remain unchanged.     
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Abstract  
 
The paper deals with the subtraction rule, which has been proposed by the 
„working group security of supply in service of the cartel offices of the 
federal republic and the states” as an instrument to identify improperly 
inflated network access charges in the electricity industry. We analyze 
firms’ price responses and adaptations to this rule. The results suggest that 
the introduction of the subtraction rule would increase prices, regardless of 
whether network access charges are improperly inflated or not. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On April 24, 1998, Germany implemented the EU Electricity Market Directive from 1996 
into a new energy law, the Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (EnWG). With this legal change, 
Germany opened its market fully to competition, ending the era of regional monopolies 
protected by demarcation agreements. Under the new law, each consumer is allowed to 
choose from a wide range of different suppliers. However, various complaints from new 
suppliers and consumers suggest that certain problems are still present. Especially, complaints 
about high network access charges indicate that these might be improperly inflated. 
Therefore, the „working committee security of supply in service of the cartel offices of the 
federal republic and the states“ (Arbeitsauschuss Versorgungssicherheit der Kartellbehörden 
des Bundes und der Länder) appointed at its meeting on October 12/13, 2000 in Mainz the 
„working group electricity network utilization of the antitrust divisions of the federal republic 
and the states“ (Arbeitgruppe Netznutzung Strom der Kartellbehörden des Bundes und der 
Länder) to examine the submitted reprovals and to work out a concept for coordinating the 
procedures among the antitrust divisions of the federation and the federal states. In their 
report1 (dated Bonn, April 19, 2001), the working group suggested a certain rule, the 
subtraction rule2 (in the following we will refer to this rule as the S-rule), which should help 
to improve the verification of improperly inflated network access charges. The working group 
describes the S-rule as follows: „From the gross-retail price of electricity (kilowatt-hour rate 
plus demand rate allocated to the kWh) for an integrated electric utility one deducts the net-
user fee and the statutory predetermined duties (electricity tax, sales tax, concession levies). 
The remaining balance constitutes the – predominantly variable – costs for procurement of 
electricity and distribution (net-price of electricity). The so computed costs for the acquisition 
of electricity and retailing can then be compared with the market prices for the procurement of 
electricity or the costs of procurement for electricity of other energy supply companies, as 
well as with the retailing costs of comparable electric utilities (because a market price doesn’t 
exist). […] If the so determined costs for procurement and distribution considerably exceed 
the market prices, or the average costs incurred by other electric utilities, respectively, this 
will indicate that the integrated electric utility knowingly charges high network usage fees in 
order to make third party access difficult. In the presence of a combination of high network 
usage fees and very low assessed procurement and retailing costs of electricity, a strong 
indication for the inappropriateness of the charged network usage fee exists. Although these 
findings alone may not suffice for the ascertainment of inappropritate fees in terms of § 19 
paragraph 4 no. 4 GWB, they are, however, suitable to support the result of an inappropriate 
pricing found in the context of the treatment of comparisons.” (p. 25f.) 
 
The recently decided TEAG-case (B11-45/01) demonstrates that the Bundeskartellamt is 
indeed willing to apply the S-rule in order to find out whether network owners demand   
improperly inflated nework access charges. Although the TEAG-decision is mainly based on 
a cost enquiry, the cartel office has also calculated the price and cost elements of the S-rule 
and concludes that the result points into the same direction as the result of the cost analysis 
(see B11-45/01, p. 33).  Since the wording in the text is quite cautious, one gets the 
impression that the cartel office itself is not sure, yet, whehter the S-rule can serve the 
                                                          
1 Report about 1. the coverage from the intervention norms according to the antitrust regulations in inspecting 
the level of network access charges for power supply usage, and  2. the relevance of the antitrust regulation of 
impeding behavioral patterns shown by electricity network owners in relation of network access.” 
(Bericht über die 1. Reichweite der kartellrechtlichen Eingriffsnormen für die Überprüfung der Höhe des 
Entgelts für die Nutzung der Stromnetze, and 2. die kartellrechtliche Relevanz von den Netzzugang 
behindernden Verhaltensweisen der Stromnetzbetreiber.) 
2 The text refers to this rule as the „Subtraktions-/Vergleichsmethode (bezüglich der Kostenbestandteile). 
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intended purpose. In the present paper, we will argue that the S-rule should not be introduced. 
We will show that the implementation of the S-rule entails a strong tendency to increase 
prices. Using a Hotelling (1929)-type duopoly model, we develop this result by comparing 
two states; one state in which the S-rule is implemented, and one where it is not.  
 
Section 2 contains the basic framework, and derives equilibrium prices when the S-rule is not 
implemented. Section 3 derives equilibrium prices when the S-rule is implemented. In Section 
4 we analyse several alternative response strategies, by which network owner may react to the 
introduction of the S-rule. Finally, Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to an 
appendix. 
 
2. The basic framework 
 
First of all, it is  important to notice that electricity is not a homogenous good in the economic 
sense of the word. Though electricity is a highly standardized product from a technical point 
of view, and therefore may be seen as a homogeneous good in a physical sense, it is not  
homogenous in the economic sense. It already starts with consumers‘ preferences for certain 
types of primary energy usage. Some people prefer electricty generated from renewable 
energy sources instead of nuclear power, some desire electricity generated from municipal 
suppliers, and still others prefer electricity from “newcomers” in order to promote 
competition. In these cases, we talk about ideal preferences. They are very distinctive only 
with a minority of consumers. Much more important is the fact that consumers possess a 
distinct preference for a reliable supply. Though a large part of the services guaranteeing the 
reliability of supply is automatically covered by certain supplementary services, the 
perception of the consumer is that some suppliers are more reliable than others. Moreover, 
there are some extra services which are offered by some firms and not by others. In many 
cases, the personnel from the supplier’s retail division maintains face-to-face contact with 
larger customers, thereby, influencing their decision making. Therefore, the selling of 
electricity concerns in all its particulars a market with differentiated products. Consequently, 
we will model the electricity market as a differentiated product market.  
 
The formal structure of the model is as follows. There is a continuum of consumers φ .  They 
are uniformely distributed in terms of tastes on a line of potential products of length one, e.g., 
],[ 10∈φ . We assume that a consumer’s preferences can be described by  
 
(1)                                                          iii ptrpU −−−= 2)()( φφφ , 
where ip  denotes the price of variety iφ . The term 2)( it φφ −  represents the disutility (in 
money units), which a consumer experiences, if he buys iφ  instead of his most preferred 
variety φ . The parameter r  describes the utility from consuming φ . In the following we 
assume that r  is large in the sense that every consumer will purchase one or the other variety, 
e.g., we assume that the market is fully covered. This assumption is very likely to be fulfilled 
in the electricity market, given observed prices and the willingness to pay for electricity. 
 
The demand side of the model presupposes that demand is price inelastic, and that each 
consumer buys exactly one unit of electricity. The latter assumption means that we consider a 
kind of „standardized“ customer. This perception requires that a real customer buying only 
half of that quantity has to be considered as a „half“ customer, and a customer buying 100 
times more than the standardized customer has to be viewed as „100 customers“. Of course, in 
practice a large customer will behave differently than 100 small customers buying the same 
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amount, and indeed, this distinction may become important if one enters into a detailed 
investigation of the abuse of a dominant market position. However, at our level of abstraction 
ignoring the differences between small and large customers is insubstantial. The notion of a 
standardized customer implies that the sales of a firm coincide with the number of 
(standardized) customers. 
 
There are two firms, A  and B , supplying some region with electricity. The varieties offered  
are Aφ  and Bφ , respectively, with ],[, 10∈BA φφ . Without loss of generality, we assume that 
BA φφ < . Moreover, we assume that BA φφ −= 1 , which means that product differentiation 
advantages are symmetric. This assumption together with the inequality BA φφ <  implies that 
[/,] 210∈Aφ  and [,/] 121∈Bφ .  
 
A consumer who is indifferent between the two firms is located at ),( BAA ppd=φ , where 
φ is obtained by equating utilities, e.g., )()( BA pUpU φφ = . With )( 12 −= BtT φ , firms‘ 
respective demands can be written as  
 
(2)                             ),(),(
T
pp
ppd ijBAi
−+== 1
2
1φ  ji ≠ , BAji ,, = . 
 
In Germany, network owners are to a large extent vertically integrated with generation and 
retail supply services. At the same time, they have to provide transmission services to any 
competing supplier. According to this ownership structure, we assume that one firm (firm A ) 
is a new firm, which entered the market after deregulation, while B  is vertically integrated 
and owns the distribution network and power producing facilities. Let Ar  denote the network 
usage price charged by B , and denote the variable (constant) unit costs of  network usage by 
Br . Each firm is able to satisfy its demand either by generating electricity with own power 
plants or by buying electricity on the wholesale market. Denote i ‘s variable (constant) unit 
procurement costs by ic , BAi ,= . Variable (constant) unit retail supply costs are denoted by 
BAiv i ,, = .  
 
With this notation firms‘ profit functions can be expressed as  
 
(3)                                    ))((),(
T
pp
mppp ijiiBAi
−+−=Π 1
2
1 ,                         
 
where iiii vcrm ++=  are i ’s overall marginal costs, ji ≠ , BAji ,, = . The first order 
conditions yield the reaction functions 
 
(4)                                               
2
Tpm
pp jiji
++=)( .     
 
In equilibrium firm i  sets the price  
 
(5)                                                          Tmmp jii ++= )(* 23
1
. 
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Note that prices increase with the degree of product differentiation 12 −=− BAB φφφ . Indeed, 
if AB φφ −  increases, T  increases, implying a higher price of each firm. Firm i’s output is 
given by  
 
(6)                                                   
T
Tmm
q iji 6
3+−=* .    
 
To avoid corner solutions, we assume that Tmm AB 3<− || . Equilibrium profits can be 
computed as 
 
(7)                                                
T
Tmm ij
i 18
3 2)(* +−=Π .   
 
In principle, the distribution network provides its owner with a tool to practice market 
foreclosure. In a completely deregulated market the network owner could refuse to provide 
access to rival suppliers, or equivalently may engage in a price squeeze (e.g., charge them an 
exorbitant price). The final price then would be close to the monopoly level. In order to 
prevent such an outcome the price of network usage has to be regulated in some way. The 
German approach to solving the network pricing problem is based on the so-called negotiated 
third party access model. It leaves the detailed regulation of network access and transmission 
pricing to be negotiated by the different associations in the electricity industry. The results of 
these talks were written down in the associations agreement or Verbändevereinbarung (VV) 
in May 1998. Revised versions of the first VV were determined in December 1999 and 
December 2001. As already mentioned in the introduction, however, certain problems still 
seem to exist. In particular, complaints about excessive network access and transmission 
prices suggest that prices, at least in some cases, might be improperly inflated.  
 
In order to detect excessive network usage prices, the “working group for electricity network 
utilization” has proposed to introduce the S-rule. In terms of our notation this means that the 
Bundeskartellamt wants to calculate the difference ABAAAB mpvcrpS −=−−−= . If this 
value is negative, it is concluded that Ar is improperly inflated, while a nonnegative value 
indicates that Ar is appropriate. Note that S is the difference between B ’s final price and A ’s 
overall marginal costs. One might ask why instead of S the balance is not based on the value 
of BBAB vcrp −−− . If this were the case, the S-rule could be seen as a kind of Areeda-
Turner-test which, however, is difficult to implement, since the network owner could always 
try to shuffle costs from the generation and retail division into the network division. The 
potential advantage of the S-rule is that, in priniciple, all determinants are observable. 
However, this does not mean that the S-rule does not entail any problems. 
 
Especially, if the retail supply and/or procurement costs of the network owner are lower than 
the respective costs of the rival, it is possible that he will charge his customers a cost covering 
price which, however, leads to a negative value of S . This is possible, even if the price for 
network usage is appropriately set. 
 
To see this, define BA rrr −=∆ , BA ccc −=∆ , and BA vvv −=∆ . A positive r∆  indicates that 
the network usage price might be improperly inflated, while a r∆  close to zero suggests that 
the access price is appropriate. A positive c∆  ( v∆ ) means that A  has a cost advantage with 
respect to electricity generation (retail supply), while a negative value states that B  has a cost 
advantage. 
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Assume that the network usage price is appropriate, e.g., 0=∆r , and the network owner is 
more efficient than his rival, e.g., 0<∆+∆ vc . Then, the value of S  is given by 
 
 
(8)                                   Tv)c(rvcp S AAA
*
B
* +∆+∆−=−−−=
3
2 ,                  
 
where the second equality follows from the assumption that the network usage price is 
appropriate. Straightforward calculations establish the following lemma:  
 
Lemma 1 One has  
 
(9)                                              Tmm0S AB
*
2
3−<⇔< . 
 
Lemma 1 states that the value of S  is negative if the network owner is more efficient and the 
degree of product differention is not too large. Thus, the lemma shows that the S-rule can lead 
to mistakes. The network owner may be accused of abusing his dominant market position  by 
charging an excessive network usage price, even if this is not the case (type II error). Of 
course, as long as the S-rule is not implemented, this has no consequences, and firm behavior 
is not affected.  
 
3. Pricing in presence of the subtraction rule 
 
Any antitrust enforcement institution is faced with costs in its effort to distinguish between 
“competitive” and “anticompetitive” behavior of firms. These costs include the direct costs of 
identifying firms which are considered to violate antitrust laws. However, these costs are 
likely to be small since relatively few firms are ever subject directly to antitrust sanctions. The 
main costs are caused by firms’ responses and adaptations to antitrust rules, and the way how 
they affect prices, costs and innovation; see Joskow (2002, p. 97/98). 
 
If a network owner is confronted with the conjecture of abusing his dominant market position, 
he will anticipate a possible costly investigation and the risk of a dissuasion or a serious fine. 
Perhaps he must also act on the assumption of suffering from bad press, thereby forfeiting his 
reputation. In order to avoid these inconveniences, it can be expected that in many cases the 
network owner will refrain from actions which abet the conjecture of abusing a dominant 
position.  
 
In this section we analyze the pricing behavior of firms under the assumption that the 
Bundeskartellamt implements the S-rule, and violations are subject to sanctions. We assume 
that the sanctions are increasing linearly with the violation of the S-rule, e.g., if the Kartellamt 
observes 0<S , the penalty will be ||Sk  with 0>k .  
 
Note that A ’s profit function is not affected by the introduction of the S-rule. It is the same as 
in the situation, where a violation of the S-rule is not punished, e.g. given by (3) in Section 2. 
However, the new rule changes the profit function of the network owner, which now reads  
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(10)                          
0
0
if
if
<
≥
⎩⎨
⎧
−Π
Π=Π
S
S
Skpp
pp
pp
BAB
BAB
BAB ||),(
),(
),(~ ,                        
with ),( BAB ppΠ  given in (3). Since AB mpS −= ,  (10) can be written as  
 
(11)                  
AB
AB
ABBAB
BAB
BAB mp
mp
mpkpp
pp
pp <
≥
⎩⎨
⎧
−+Π
Π=Π
if
if
)(),(
),(
),(~ .      
 
The S-rule changes the network owner’s incentives. As can be seen from equation (11), 
quoting a lower price will be punished if this leads to a violation of the S-rule. Thus, setting a 
low price becomes costly for B . The strategic effects can be best described with help of the 
firms’ reaction functions. While firm A ’s reaction function is still given by equation (4), B ’s 
reaction function changes. In order to calculate the latter one has to take into account that B ’s 
profit function has a downward kink at AB mp = . The kink produces a discrete jump of the 
marginal profit function at this point:  
 
(12)             
AB
AB
BBA
B
B
BA
B
B
BA
B
B
mp
mp
kppp
p
pp
ppp
p <
≥
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
+∂
Π∂
∂
Π∂
=∂
Π∂
if
if
),(
),(
),(
~
. 
 
Lemma 2 The network owner’s reaction function is given by  
(13)          
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−>
−≤≤+−−
+−−<+
=
BAAAB
BAABAA
BAAAB
AB
mmppp
mmpTkmmm
TkmmpkTpp
pp
2  if           
2122  if                 
122  if  
)(
)(
)()(
)(~ . 
 
 
Proof see Appendix 
 
With this result we are ready to prove the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1 There exists a uniqe price equilibrium )~,~( ** BA pp . With  
 
(14) TkmR A )( 2
321 +−=     and    TmR A 2
3
2 −=  
 
the following holds: (1) If 1RmB < , then  
 
(15) ))()(,)()(()~,~( ** TkmmTkmmpp ABBABA 13
42
3
11
3
22
3
1 ++++++= .  
 
The resulting balance AB mpS −= ** ~~  is given by  
 
 TkmmS AB )2
32()(
3
2~* ++−= . 
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Firms‘ profits are  
 
(16)                        ))(,)(()~,~( **
T
kTTmm
T
kTTmm BAAB
BA 18
23
18
23 22 −+−++−=ΠΠ . 
 
(2) If 21 RmR B ≤≤ , then  
 
(17) ),()~,~( ** AABA m
Tmpp
2
+= ,  
 
 AmS =*~ , 
 
(18)                                       ( ))(,()~,~ ** BABA mm
T −=ΠΠ
4
3
8
. 
 
(3) If BmR <2 , then 
                           ))(,)((),()~,~( **** TmmTmmpppp ABBABABA ++++== 23
12
3
1 , 
 
 )(~* TmmS AB 2
3
3
2 +−= , 
and 
 
                                ).
18
)3(,
18
)3((),()~,~(
22
****
T
Tmm
T
Tmm BAAB
BABA
+−+−=ΠΠ=ΠΠ      
Proof see Appendix  
 
According to Proposition 1 three different types of equilibrium exist. Which one occurs 
depends on the network owner’s marginal costs relative to those of A . If B ’s costs are 
substantially lower than A ‘s, e.g., !RmB < , his price will be so low that the S-rule is violated; 
see Figure 1.  
 
Bp
Ap
)( BA pp
)( AB pp
*~
Ap
*~
Bp
** ~~
AB pp >
Am
 
Figure 1: price equilibrium with S-rule being violated. 
 
 10
 
 
 
 
The second type of equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2.  
 
Bp
Ap
)( BA pp
)( AB pp
*~
Ap
AB mp =*~
 
Figure 2: price equilibrium with S-rule being exactly fulfilled.  
 
It occurs, if B ’s costs are moderately lower than A ’s costs, e.g., if 21 RmR B ≤≤ . A ’s 
reaction curve then crosses B ’s reaction function in its flat segment. The network owner then 
chooses a price which exactly fulfills the S-rule. The third type of equilibrium is shown in 
Figure 3.  
 
Bp
Ap
)( BA pp
)( AB pp
*~
Ap
Am *~Bp
 
Figure 3: price equilibrium with S-rule being fulfilled. 
 
 
In this case, B  has only a small cost advantage or a cost disadvantage relative to A , e.g., 
BmR <2 , and B 's price does not violate the S-rule. Comparing the prices and profits in (5) 
and (7) with those stated in Proposition 1 leads to the following corollary:  
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Corollary 1 If 2RmB < , then the introduction of the S-rule will lead both firms to increase 
their price. Profits of both firms increase. If 2RmB ≥ , prices and profits will remain 
unchanged.  
 
Proof: see Appendix 
 
Note that 2RmB <  is equivalent to 0<*S  (see Lemma 1). This means that in the absence of 
the S-rule the network owner would set his price below A ’s marginal costs. If the S-rule is 
implemented, however, pricing below A ’s marginal costs would violate the S-rule, triggering 
a sanction. By increasing his price the network owner can reduce or avoid the sanction. When 
B  increases his price, A  will follow suit, since reaction functions are upward sloping. Indeed, 
this is what will happen so that the introduction of the S-rule leads both firms to charge higher 
prices, making all consumers worse off. If 2RmB ≥ , the S-rule does not affect the firms‘ 
behavior. Since the network owner’s price *Bp which prevailed before the introduction of the 
S-rule does not violate it, B  has no reason to change his price. Since *Ap  is a best response to 
*
Bp , A  will also continue to charge the same price.  
 
Note that a decrease in T  increases the boundaries 1R  and 2R ; see equation (14). This means 
that a decrease in the degree of product differentiation enlarges the range of cost parameters 
Bm , where an implementation of the S-rule affects (e.g., increase) firms‘ prices. An intuition 
for this result can be given as follows.  
Notice that 
~
*S  is influenced by T  and Bm  through B ’s price 
*~
Bp .
3 As *~Bp  is both increasing 
in Bm  and T ,
4 a lower value of T  allows a higher value of Bm  without changing the sign of 
*S . But this is equivalent to shifting 1R  and 2R  to the right if T  decreases (see Figure 4).  
 
S* < 0 S* = 0 S* > 0
BmR1 R2
 
Figure 4: Parameter regions where the S-rule is violated, exactly fulfillded, fulfilled (but not 
exactly). 
 
In the extreme case of homogeneous products and identical marginal costs, each firm sets its  
price equal to marginal costs. The balance *S  then is zero so that the S-rule is exactly 
fulfilled. In the case, where the network owner‘s marginal costs are lower than those of his 
rival A , he sets a price slighty below A ’s marginal costs in order to win the whole market 
implying that the S-rule is slightly violated. On the other hand, if A  has lower marginal costs, 
A  wins the whole market, and the S-rule is not violated. With homogeneous goods the 
boundaries 1R  and 2R  are identical and equal to Am .  
 
The boundary 1R  shifts to the right if k  decreases. To understand this recall that 1R  
delineates the region where B ’s pricing behavior triggers a sanction (e.g., if 1RmB < ) from 
                                                          
3 Recall, that AB mpS −= *
~
* ~ . 
4 An increase in T  gives B more market power leading to a higher price.  
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the zone where B ’s price leads to an exact fulfillment of the S-rule (e.g., if 21 RmR B <≤ ). 
The sanction is a cost element for B increasing its price. If the sanction becomes less severe, 
e.g., if k  decreases, higher values of Bm  are compatible with a negative value of 
*S , and this 
is equivalent with 1R  shifting to the right if k  becomes smaller (see Figure 4). If k  goes to 
zero, 1R  approaches  2R , and in the limit conicides with 2R .  
 
The boundary 2R  is independent of k . The reason is that on the parameter sets demarcated by 
2R , B ’s pricing behavior does not violate the S-rule and therefore, the fine parameter does 
not play any role in these regions.   
 
4. Alternative response strategies 
 
In Section 3 we have seen that the implementation of the S-rule changes the strategic situation 
between firms. We determined the price equilibrium )~,~( ** BA pp  in the modified game and 
showed that the network owner accepts the sanction if he has substantially lower marginal 
costs than his rival, e.g., if 1RmB <  (see Proposition 1). It turned out that if the S-rule affects 
the firms‘ pricing, e.g., if 2RmB < , prices will be higher than in the situation where the S-rule 
is not implemented (see Proposition 2). 
 
In this section we analyze several alternative strategies, by which the network owner might 
respond to the introduction of the S-rule. The first (alternative) response strategy (RS) we 
wish to consider is:  
 
RS 1 If the S-rule is implemented, B  chooses a best response to A ’s price under the 
condition that the S-rule is not violated.  
 
This strategy is based on the decision of the network owner to strictly avoid a confrontation 
with the cartel office. The objective is accomplished by increasing the price, if necessary, 
such that the new balance S  is no longer negative. 
 
Proposition 2 Suppose that the network owner responds to the introduction of the S-rule 
according to RS-1. (1) If 2RmB < , then prices will be given by  
 
(19)                                                         ),(),( AABA m
Tmpp
2
11 += . 
 
The resulting balance AB mpS −= 11  is equal to zero. Firms‘ profits are  
 
(20)                                                     ))(,(),( BABA mm
T −=ΠΠ
4
3
8
11 .  
 
(2) If 2RmB ≥ , then prices and profits are the same as those given in part (3) of Proposition 1. 
 
The proof is similar to that of Propositon 1 and therefore omitted. Figure 5a illustrates the first 
part of the propostition. Since at the formerly prevailing price *Bp  the balance 
*S  is negative, 
B will increase his price by *SpB =∆ so that B’s new price is AB mp =1 . A ’s best response to 
Am  is 2
1 /Tmp AA += . Given ),( 11 BA pp , no further price change will occur. Firm A  has no 
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incentive to deviate since his price is on his reaction curve. It is straightforward to verify that 
B  has no incentive to increase his price further. Moreover, since B  acts according to RS-1, 
he will not decrease his price, because this would violate the S-rule. The second part of 
Proposition 2 is shown in Figure 5b. In this case, the constraint of RS-1 is not binding so that 
firms choose mutual best responses.  
 
Bp
Ap
Am
1
Bp
1
Ap
Bp
Ap
AB mp =1*Bp
*
Ap
1
Ap
 
                    Figure 5a: price equilibrium with                 Figure 5b: price equilibrium with  
                    S-rule being violated.                                    S-rule being fulfilled. 
 
Comparing prices and profits stated in Proposition 1 with those in Proposition 2 leads to the 
following corollary:  
 
Corollary 2 If 1RmB < , then *~ii pp >1  and *~ ii Π>Π1 , and if 1RmB ≥ , then *~ii pp =1  and 
*~
ii Π=Π1 , BAi ,= .  
 
Thus, if B  has substantially lower marginal costs than A , e.g., if 1RmB < , then both prices 
and profits are higher than the respective values in (14) and (15). Indeed, this will be the case, 
regardless of whether the network usage fee is improperly inflated or not. The reason is that 
under RS-1, overall marginal costs of firm A act as a price floor for B , which is binding if 
2RmB ≤ .5 Since B  is better off by responding according to RS-1 (and also A  is better off), it 
should be expected that B  will choose response strategy RS-1 instead of that described in 
Proposition 1.  
  
Of course, the network owner could achieve a non-negative balance S  also by decreasing the 
network usage fee Ar , since this will reduce A ’s overall marginal costs Am . This observation 
leads us to the second (alternative) response strategy we wish to consider:  
 
RS-2 0<*S , then B  responds to the introduction of the S-rule by decreasing Ar  such that the 
S-rule is exactly fulfilled. To price changes of A , the network owner chooses a best response 
under the condition that the S-rule is not violated. If 0≥*S , B  leaves Ar unchanged and 
continues to play *Bp .  
 
 
                                                          
5 Note that Am  is not only binding if 1RmB < , but also if 21 RmR B ≤≤ .  
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Proposition 3 Suppose that the network owner responds to the introduction of the S-rule 
according to RS-2. (1) if 2RmB < , then prices will be given by  
 
(21)                                                     ),(),( ** BBBA p
Tppp
2
22 += ,  
where *Bp  is given in (5). The resulting balance AB mpS −= 22  is equal to zero. Firms‘ profits 
are  
 
(22)                              ),(),(
44
3
68
322 BABA
BA
mmTmmT −+−−=ΠΠ . 
 
(2) If 2RmB ≥ , then prices and profits are the same as those given in part (3) of Propostiion 1. 
 
 
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2 and therefore omitted. If 0<*S , the network will 
decrease the network price by ** BAA pmSr −==∆ , which decreases A ’s marginal costs. With 
marginal costs AA rm ∆− , A ’s best response to *Bp  is 2/* TpB + . After this price change no 
further price change will occur. Firm A  has no incentive to deviate since its price is on its 
reaction curve. Given 2/* TpB + , B  has no incentive to increase his price above *Bp . 
Moreover, B  will not decrease his price, because this would violate the S-rule. 
 
Comparing prices and profits described in Proposition 2 with those in Proposition 3 leads to 
the following corollary:  
 
Corollary 3 If 1RmB < , then 21 ii pp >  and 21 ii Π>Π , and if 1RmB ≥ , then 21 ii pp =  and 
21
ii Π=Π , BAi ,= .  
 
Corollary 3 states that from B ’s point of view (and also from A ’s viewpoint) response 
strategy RS-1 is (weakly) better than RS-2. Again, this will be the case, regardless of whether 
the network usage fee is improperly inflated or not. Recall from Corollary 2 that profits 
resulting from RS-1 are also higher than those arising from the behavior prescribed in 
Proposition 1. Thus, since B  is a profit maximizing firm, we can conclude that B will choose 
RS-1 if the Kartellamt introduces the S-rule. Accordingly, in order to determine the effects of 
the S-rule on the firms‘ pricing behavior we have to compare the prices stated in Proposition 2 
with those in (7). The following Proposition contains the comparison of both prices and 
profits.  
 
Proposition 4 Suppose that the Kartellamt introduces the S-rule Then, the following holds: 
(1) If 2RmB < , then prices and profits of both firms will increase, e.g., *ii pp >1 , and 
*1
ii Π>Π . (2) If 2RmB ≥ , then prices and profits remain the same.  
 
Proof see Appendix 
 
Proposition 4 states that if the network owner’s overall marginal costs is moderately or 
significantly lower than those of his rival, e.g., if 2RmB < , then both firms will set higher 
prices than in the case, where the S-rule is not implemented. This will be the case, regardless 
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of whether the network usage fee is improperly inflated or not. Thus, we arrive at a negative 
judgement of the S-rule.  
 
The following reasoning points at a further weakness of the concept. Elberfeld and von 
Weizsäcker (2002) argue that the S-rule will always be misleading if the relevant cost 
elements, especially the procurement and retail supply costs, are miscalculated. The 
procurement costs cannot be simply registered by the stock market price. In the presence of 
long term contracts, the supplier will generate in many cases the power by himself. In this 
case, however, the relevant procurement costs are the variable average costs, which might be 
lower than the stock market price. The retail supply costs are predominantly considered as 
variable by the cartel office. However, the analysis of Elberfeld and von Weizsäcker  (2002) 
reveals that these costs are to a high degree irreversible and fixed. Thus, the procedure of the 
cartel office leads to an overestimation of the true, and for the network owner’s pricing 
decision relevant procurement and retail supply costs.   
 
Finally, we wish to point out that the obtained results are not restricted to the electricity 
industry. In fact, they readily apply to any network based industry like gas and 
telecommunication.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In order to detect excessive network usage prices, the „working group electricity network 
utilization of the antitrust divisions of the federal republic and the states“  proposed to 
introduce the S-rule. Under this rule the cartel office would calculate the difference between 
the network owner’s price and overall marginal costs of the rival, including network access 
charges, which the competitor has to pay to the network owner. If this value is negative, it 
would be concluded that network access charges are improperly inflated. One problem of this 
rule is that the calculated value can be negative, even if the price for network usage is 
appropriately set. This outcome is most likely to occur, if the network owner is substantially 
more efficient than his rival. Since the network owner is punished if he violates the S-rule, the 
introduction of it changes his incentives. By increasing his price the network owner can 
reduce or avoid the sanction. If he increases his price, the rival will increase his price as well, 
since reaction functions are upward sloping. Indeed, this is what happens so that the 
introduction of the S-rule leads both firms to charge higher prices, making all consumers 
worse off. If the network owner has only a small efficiency advantage or is even less efficient 
than the rival, the S-rule does not affect the behavior of the firms. In this situation prices will 
be the same as before the introduction of the S-rule.  
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Appendix  
 
Proof of Lemma 2 We proceed in three steps. (1) If AB mp < , then the equations (3) and (11) 
imply that  
 
 )()()(),(~ ABBABBBAB mpkT
ppmppp −+−+−=Π 1
2
1 ) 
 
Solving 0=∂
Π∂
B
B
p
~
 for Bp gives  
 
 kTppTkmppp ABBAAB +=+++= )()()(~ 2
12 , 
 
with )( AB pp  given in (4). )(~ AB pp  is B ’s reaction function as long as AAB mpp <)(~ . Since 
this inequality is equivalent to  
 
(23) Tkmmp BAA )( 122 +−−< ,  
 
it follows that kTpppp ABAB += )()(~  is B ’s reaction function, if inequality (23) holds. (2) In 
a similar way one shows that if AB mp > , )()(~ ABAB pppp =  is B ’s reaction function if 
ABA pmm <−2 . (3) It remains to be shown that AAB mpp =)(~  if  
 
(24) BAABA mmpTkmm −≤≤+−− 2)12(2  
 
We show that for all Ap  satisfying the inequalities in (24) and for all AB mp ≠  
 
(25)                                  0>Π−Π ),(),(~ BABAAB ppmp  
 
If AB mp < , (3) and (11) imply that  
 
 )()(),(~
T
ppmmmp BABAAAB
−+−=Π 1
2
1 , 
while 
 )()()(),( ABBABBAAB mpkT
ppmpmp −+−+−=Π 1
2
1 . 
 
It follows that (25) holds if and only if Tkpmmp BBAA )( 12 +−+−> . This inequality is 
satisfied since, by assumption, AB mp <  and Tkmmp BAA )( 122 +−−> . If AB mp > , then 
(25) is equivalent to BBAA pmmp +−< . This inequality is holds, because AB mp >  and 
BAA mmp −< 2  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 The equilibrium is determined by the intersection of A ’s reaction 
function given in (4) with B ’s reaction function in (13). Since B ’s reaction function is flatter 
than (the inverse of) A ’s, and starts with higher values, it is clear that at most one equilibrium 
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can exist. (1) )( BA pp  crosses the section of )(~ AB pp  with values smaller than Am , if and only 
if 
 
 Tkmmmp BAAA )()( 122 +−−<  
 
(see also Figure 1). Since 2/)( Tmmp AAA += , the inequality is equivalent to  
 
 Tkmm AB )( 2
32 +−<  
 
Solving A ’s reaction function for Bp  leads to Tmpp AAB −−= 2 . The solution of  
 
 TmpTkmppp AABAAB −−=+++= 22
12 )(
)(~  
gives the equilibrium price .)()(/~* Tkmmp BAA 13
2231 +++=  It follows that B ’s equilibrium 
price is Tkmmp ABB )/()(/~
* 134231 +++= . (2) )( BA pp  intersects the constant part of 
AAB mpp =)(~  if and only if  
 
 TmmTkm ABA 2
3
2
32 −≤≤+− )( . 
 
A’s equilibrium price is the solution of  
 
 Tmpmpp AAAAB −−== 2)(~ , 
 
which is ./~* Tmp AA 21+=  (3) )( BA pp  crosses the part of )(~ AB pp  with values larger than 
Am , if and only if  
 
 BA mTm <− 2
3 . 
 
A ’s equilibrium price is the solution of  
 
 TmpTmppp AABAAB −−=++= 22)(
~ ,  
 
which is Tmmp BAA ++= )(/~ * 231 . It follows that B ’s equilibrium price is 
Tmmp ABB ++= )(/~* 231 . 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 1 (1) Suppose that 1RmB < . Then, it is easily checked that for 
BAi ,= *~ip  in (15) is greater than *ip  in (5), since 0>k . Also, comparing the profits in (7) 
with those in (16) immediately shows that **~ AA Π>Π  and .~ ** BB Π<Π  (2) Assume that 
21 RmR B ≤≤ . Comparing prices in (5) with those in (17) shows that both 1AA pp <*~  and 
1
BB pp <*~  are equivalent to 2RmB < . Next, observe that 
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** ~/)/()( AABA TTTmm Π=<+−=Π 8183 2  ⇔  223 RTmm AB =−< / , where the latter 
inequality is fulfilled by assumption. Thus, A ’s profits will be higher after the introduction of 
the S-rule. The same holds for B ’s profits. To see this, observe that  
 
(26)                               )(
4
3
18
))(3(~ 2**
BA
BA
BB mmT
mmT −−−−=Π−Π  
 
is decreasing in BA mm − . Thus, the difference is negative for all 22/3 RTmm AB =−< ,  if  it  
negative for Tmm AB 2/3−= , or equivalently, for Tmm BA 2/3=− . Substituting this value 
into (26) gives 08/98/1~ ** <−=Π−Π TTBB . (2) If 2RmB ≥ , the prices and profits described 
in Proposition 1 are the same as those given in Proposition 2. 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 2 (1) Suppose that 1RmB < . Comparing prices in (5) with those in (19) 
shows that both 1AA pp <*~  and 1BB pp <*~  are equivalent to 2RmB < . The latter inequality is 
fulfilled since 1RmB <  and 21 RR < . Comparing profits in (16) with those in (20) reveals that 
1
AA Π<Π *~  is equivalent to 1RmB < , where the latter inequality is satisfied by assumption.  
To prove that 1BB Π<Π *~  it suffices to show that 1BB Π<Π * , because **~ BB Π<Π ; *BΠ  is given in 
(7). It can be easily checked that the inequality 1BB Π<Π *  is equivalent to  
 
(27)                                    0
18
623 <+−+−
T
mmTmmT BABA ))(/( . 
 
Note that BA mTm <− 3 6 implies BA mTm <− 3  implies that BA mTm <− 6 . Thus, (27) holds 
if and only if 023 <+− BA mmT/ , or equivalenty, if 2RmB < .The latter inequality is 
fulfilled because 1RmB <  (by assumption) and 21 RR <  (by definition). (2) If 1RmB ≥ , the 
prices and profits given in Proposition 1 and  2 are the same. 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 3 (1) Suppose that 1RmB < . Comparing prices in (19) with those in (21)  
shows that both 12 AA pp <  and 12 BB pp <  are equivalent to 2RmB < . Similarly, one has that 
12
ii Π<Π , BAi ,= , is equivalent to 2RmB < . (2) If  1RmB ≥ , the prices and profits the prices 
and profits given in Proposition 2 and  3  are identical. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 (1) Suppose that 2RmB < . Comparing prices in (5) with those in (19) 
shows that both 1AA pp <*  and 1BB pp <*  are equivalent to 2RmB < . Similarly, one has that 
*
AA Π>Π1  is equivalent to 2RmB < . Thus, A’s profits will be higher after the introduction of 
the S-rule. The same holds for B’s profits. To see this, observe that  
 
(28)                               )(
4
3
18
))(3(~ 21*
BA
BA
BB mmT
mmT −−−−=Π−Π  
 
                                                          
6 The inequality holds because we have assumed that both firms produce positive quantities in equilibrium. 
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is decreasing in BA mm − . Thus, the difference is negative for all 22/3 RTmm AB =−< ,  if  it  
negative for Tmm AB 2/3−= , or equivalently, for Tmm BA 2/3=− . Substituting this value 
into (26) gives 08/98/1~ 1* <−=Π−Π TTBB . (2) If 2RmB ≥ , the prices and profits described 
in Proposition 1 are the same as those given in Proposition 2. In the proof of Corollary 2 we 
showed that *BB Π>Π1  (2) If 2RmB ≥ , the prices and profits stated in (5) and (7) are the same 
as those stated in part (2) of Proposition 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
